Schuman2030

The paper titled “Five Surgical Strikes on the Treaties of the European Union” published by the  European Papers journal proposes five key amendments aimed at overcoming constitutional stalemate within the EU and enhancing its decision-making efficacy. The authors highlight the challenges facing the EU’s treaties regarding unity, operational effectiveness, and responsiveness to changing geopolitical realities.

https://www.europeanpapers.eu/europeanforum/five-surgical-strikes-on-treaties-of-european-union

Abstract: If there is not to be a Convention to revise the Treaty of Lisbon, here is a proposal to amend some key articles in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU, to make its decision making more agile, and to enhance its capacity to act.

Summary

The central thesis of the paper is that the current treaties of the European Union are inadequate in addressing the complexities and demands of contemporary governance within the Union. The proposed amendments are categorized into five specific areas:

1. Decision-making processes: The paper emphasizes the need for streamlined decision-making procedures that can better accommodate the growing membership and diverse interests within the Union.
2. Competence issues: A realignment of competences is recommended to ensure that the distribution of powers between the EU and member states reflects modern realities and allows the Union to act more decisively.
3. Enhanced cooperation: The authors suggest mechanisms to facilitate enhanced cooperation among member states, which would enable a more united approach to shared challenges without requiring unanimous consent for every action.
4. Transparency and accountability: Improving the transparency of institutions and processes within the EU is vital to bolstering public trust and ensuring accountability among policymakers.
5. Crisis response: The paper advocates for creating provisions that enable the EU to respond more effectively to crises, ensuring rapid and coordinated action in times of need.

Analysis

The amendments suggested in the paper are rooted in a deep understanding of the operational difficulties the EU faces, especially in light of recent challenges such as Brexit, migration crises, and international security threats. By calling for reforms that enhance decision-making efficiency and improve accountability, the paper addresses key weaknesses in the current system.

Moreover, the focus on enhanced cooperation among member states acknowledges the reality of a fragmented political landscape where unanimity in decision-making can hinder timely actions. The authors’ recommendations for increased transparency align with contemporary demands for governance that is more open and responsive to citizens’ concerns.

While the proposed amendments seek to strengthen the EU’s capacity to function and respond effectively, they also initiate crucial debates about sovereignty and the balance of power between national and EU entities. This tension is an ongoing issue within the context of European integration, as member states navigate the complexities of ceding power to a central authority while maintaining their national identities and responsibilities.

In conclusion, the paper provides a robust and thought-provoking analysis of how the EU can evolve its legal frameworks to better meet current and future challenges. The suggested amendments represent an important step toward ensuring that the Union remains relevant and capable in an increasingly interconnected world, paving the way for a more integrated Europe that respects the sovereignty of its member states while fostering collective action.

Overview of the key legal principles in EU treaties

The legal principles underpinning the treaties of the European Union (EU) form a foundational aspect of its governance and operational framework. These principles not only guide the interpretation and application of EU law but also ensure adherence to fundamental values and objectives. Below is an overview of the key legal principles enshrined within the EU treaties.

General Principles of EU Law

1. Legal Certainty

Legal certainty is a fundamental principle in EU law that ensures individuals are able to understand their rights and obligations under the law. This principle promotes clarity and predictability in the legal framework, preventing arbitrary interpretations by authorities. It functions to protect individuals, allowing them to rely on the established rules and regulations of the EU without the fear of sudden changes in legal interpretation

2. Proportionality

The principle of proportionality dictates that any action taken by EU institutions must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties. This principle serves to balance the interference in individual rights against the aims pursued by the EU, ensuring that measures are measured and appropriate to their purpose.

3. Respect for Fundamental Rights

All EU actions must respect and promote fundamental rights as established in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This principle aligns EU law with international human rights standards, ensuring the protection of individual rights and freedoms across member states.

4. Equality Before the Law

This principle mandates that all individuals, regardless of nationality or status, are treated equally under EU law. It emphasizes non-discrimination and aims to provide fair treatment to all parties in legal proceedings, fostering a sense of justice and equity within the EU legal framework.

5. Primacy of EU Law

The principle of primacy dictates that EU law takes precedence over national law. In situations where national legislation conflicts with EU law, the latter prevails. This principle is essential for ensuring uniform application of EU law across member states and for maintaining the integrity of the EU legal order.

6. Subsidiarity and Proportionality

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality govern the exercise of competences within the EU. The principle of subsidiary states that the EU should only act where objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by individual member states. The proportionality principle requires that any EU action must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Union, ensuring a cooperative approach between EU and national levels of governance.

Conclusion

The legal principles embedded in EU treaties are designed to uphold the rule of law, protect individual rights, and facilitate effective governance across member states. These principles ensure that EU law remains a coherent and equitable system that addresses the needs and rights of individuals while promoting the collective interests of the Union as a whole. By adhering to these principles, the EU aims to reinforce its legitimacy and effectiveness within an increasingly complex global landscape.

Addendum on the proportionality and subsidiarity concept in EU law

The principle of proportionality and the principles of subsidiarity play significant roles in the governance of the European Union (EU), ensuring that actions taken either by EU institutions or Member States are appropriate, necessary, and respectful of the competence framework established by European treaties.

1. The Principle of Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is fundamental in EU law, ensuring that any legislative or administrative action does not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives. This principle serves as a safeguard against the overreach of EU institutions, compelling them to consider the impact of their decisions on individual rights and interests. Under this principle, any measure taken must be suitable to achieve the intended aim and also must not impose excessive burdens on individuals or entities compared to the pursued objective. Proportionality thus maintains a balance between the EU’s objectives and the rights of its citizens, promoting fair and just governance practices.

The key function of proportionality is to protect individuals and entities from undue interference by EU measures. For instance, when the EU proposes regulations affecting businesses or environmental standards, these measures must be necessary and appropriate to achieve the desired outcomes, ensuring that the least restrictive alternative is considered first. This principle also reflects the EU’s commitment to efficiency and logic in its policy-making processes, reinforcing democratic values within EU governance.

2. The Role of Subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity complements proportionality by determining the appropriate level of governance for specific actions within the EU framework. Enshrined in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), subsidiarity states that the EU should only act if objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States at a local, regional, or national level. This principle is particularly significant in shared competencies, where both the EU and Member States can legislate in the same area.

Subsidiarity ensures that decisions are made as closely as possible to the citizens they affect, preserving the idea of local governance and allowing for diversity amongst Member States. For instance, in matters of education or health policy, it respects the autonomy of individual countries, promoting local solutions that cater to national contexts. This principle not only enhances democratic legitimacy but also ensures a more effective governance structure in which EU-level interventions are justified and necessary.

Both the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity serve to reinforce the democratic fabric of the EU, ensuring that governance remains effective, responsive, and accountable to its citizens while respecting their rights and local preferences. These principles are essential in guiding the exercise of competences within the Union, aiming for a balance that respects individual states’ rights while achieving collective goals in the European community.

3. Theory and practice

Evidence suggests that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity have not always been consistently followed within the European Union (EU). This inconsistency can often be traced back to the vague boundaries defined by treaties regarding the competences of member states and the EU itself.

1. Vague Competence Boundaries

The treaties provide a framework for the division of competencies, but many areas remain ambiguous, leading to conflicts between EU actions and national sovereignty. The principle of subsidiarity stipulates that the EU should only act if objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national level, but in practice, this boundary is often blurred. For example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has sometimes interpreted EU powers broadly, allowing for actions that member states may deem unnecessary or intrusive, which can lead to challenges regarding adherence to the principle of subsidiarity.

2. Tensions Between Proportionality and Subsidiarity

In many cases, the implementation of EU laws has demonstrated a disconnect between the principle of proportionality and the spirit of subsidiarity. The ECJ’s case law shows instances where legislation has not strictly adhered to proportionality, as measures that impact national interests are pursued without adequately assessing whether less intrusive alternatives could achieve similar outcomes. This incongruence highlights the ongoing struggle within the EU to balance its powers with the principle of local governance envisaged by subsidiarity.

3. Critiques and Calls for Reform

Critics argue that the lack of clarity in defining competencies has led to overreach by EU institutions, which can undermine the legitimacy of EU governance and create friction with member states. Reports from various institutions have emphasized the need for reform to ensure that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity are respected and enforced more rigorously within the legislative process.

Thus, while the principles are theoretically vital components of EU governance, their application in real-life scenarios reveals a complex and often contentious relationship between the EU and its member states. Efforts to refine and clarify these principles are ongoing, as the EU seeks to create a more effective and coherent governance framework.

This discussion indicates that there are indeed tensions and inconsistencies in how these principles are applied, stemming from the vague competence definitions within treaties.

Src: Text edited with AI assistance of Monica.

Jack Birner has published a very timely article “The European Union: from common foreign and defence policy to federation? (Chapter 16 in Palgrave Studies in International Relations, 2025). It outlines how the idea of a federalist Europe has roots even before WWII and why it is more than ever necessary. At the same, Birner demonstrates by highlighting the difference in the thinking of Monnet and Hayek. A functional centralist federalism (which is the current state towards teh EU evolves) vs. one where the sovereignty of the nations is reinforcing factor as it stimulates competion yet requires mutial respect). To quote from the paper: “The Federal system limits and restrains sovereign power by dividing it, and by assigning to Government only certain defined rights.” (Lord Acton). This is very much along the lines of thinking in the Schuman2030 project.

Available at: https://isonomiaquarterly.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/birner-pfwo.pdf

Abstract:

Birner argues that while the EU possesses federalist characteristics, it is not yet a true federation. Using F.A. Hayek’s 1939 blueprint for a federal Europe, the work analyzes modern EU security and external relations to explore paths toward increased political unification. 

Key Aspects 

• Context: The chapter analyzes the European Union’s development within a shifting global balance of power, where the USA’s influence is contested by China, and the EU holds economic weight comparable to both but lacks equivalent political power.
• Framework:It utilizes a detailed 1939 federal Europe plan proposed by F.A. Hayek to assess the current and future agenda of the EU, suggesting Hayek’s insights are relevant for enhancing the EU’s democracy.
• Thesis: The chapter investigates whether the EU’s common foreign and defence policies (CFSP/CSDP) are propelling the union toward a federal structure.

Hereby the first DRAFT release (V.1.6) of the Working Paper 4 on the Lisbon Treaty, defining the European Union.  The first document is a short summary on the difference between intentions and practice of the Lisbon. The second document is an extensive analysis of the Lisbon treaty.

English version:

WP4-summary-Lisbon intentions_EN

WP4_OnLisbon_Feb25_EN_V1-6

Dutch (Nederlands) versie:

WP4-summary-Lisbon intentions_NL

WP4_OnLisbon_Feb25_NL_v1-6

Summary: Why the Lisbon treaty is not final

The European Union has always followed a path of successive changes, often triggered by a passage through crisis, be it internally or because of the geopolitical context. Each time, inadequacies came to light and new treaties were ratified or existing treaties were amended.

Firstly, the last treaty, i.e. the Lisbon treaty followed a curious path. Originally meant as a new treaty, the Constitution of the European Union, it was replaced by a new treaty in the form of an extensive list of amendments to existing treaties. This path is worrisome as it undermined the democratic legality of it, even if arguments can be raised that it was a necessity long overdue. It did not help in getting citizens’ support, which is a long-term risk that is currently emerging.

Secondly, the treaty was meant to increase the democratic process in Europe but this largely failed in practice. National as well as the EU parlements, even if they are the official legislative powers, largely rubberstamp the Commission’s proposals and directives. Very seldomly are these challenged. The reasons are not so much the treaty itself but the fact that the real power is under control of political parties and the nation’s executive powers. It should be noted that this reflect very often the situation at national level which is projected at the EU level. In both cases, the members of parliament who are supposed to represent the citizens, do not act on behalf of the citizens but on behalf of political parties and the power structures behind them. And as was pointed out, this undermining of democratic principles is reinforced by a salient majority that has intruded the institutions and media. In addition, lobbying by strong groups and organisations heavily influences the decision-making processes. The Lisbon treaty does not seem to have anticipated these democracy undermining actors.

Thirdly, the Lisbon treaty transferred many competences from the national to the European level. It allowed the EU to impose stringent measures on all member states during the Covid epidemic, stringent CO2 emission obligations, a counter-productive energy policy and an avalanche of regulations in many domains that impact on the industry but also on citizens’ daily life. It is questionable if these grand schemes like the “Green Deal” would ever have materialised if a real democratic decision process would have been in place. Practice has also shown that the treaty did not establish clear boundaries between competences at the national and supra-national level. This weakness was exploited to impose many regulations from the top, often ignoring that the EU is composed of a heterogenous set of nation states.

Fourthly, the Lisbon treaty did no establish a structure that would have allowed the EU to act as a strong unified block at the supra-national level. While some steps were taken, in practice the EU still acts as a weak, opportunistic collection of national states and heads of state, while important decisions can still be blocked by a single member state. This concerns domains like defence, international politics, economic policies and innovation strategy.

And last but not least, if one looks at what the EU in Europe achieved in the last 20 years, then it is clear that the treaty was fraught with wishful thinking. The position of the EU in the world has been shrinking economically as well as politically and continues to do so. The EU is known for its high level of social security programs, taxes, regulations and quality of education. These are increasingly financed by debt whereas the economy is shrinking and hence the export balance is not generating the means to finance it. Other power hegemonies are exploiting this weakness, be it economically or geopolitically. Would there have been a tariff war if the EU would have in a strong economic position? Would there have been a huge import dependency on China if the European industry would have remained competitive? Would there have been a war with Russia, if the EU would have had a strong deterrent defence organisation?

All above points to the need revising the Lisbon treaty. On the one hand, competences need to be delegated back to the nation states and citizens need to regain democratic control. Guidelines and norms can be supra-national, concrete regulations can be national. One the other hand, the EU needs a much stronger structure at the supra-national level. In essence, the EU should focus exclusively on those domains that are supra-national by definition and in practice.

Proposals for amending the current EU treaties, particularly the Treaty of Lisbon, have emerged to address various issues identified in the EU’s functioning and governance. In the last section we highlight some key proposals and discussions surrounding these amendments. Most of these focus on the creation of a federal state or clarify the current treaties whereas we believe that in line with Schuman’s ideas nothing excludes more sovereignty at the national level. This topic of reform initiatives is being elaborated more in detail in a subsequent Working Paper.

Nederlands:

Waarom het Verdrag van Lissabon niet definitief is

De Europese Unie heeft altijd een traject van opeenvolgende veranderingen doorlopen, vaak ingegeven door een periode van crisis, hetzij intern, hetzij vanwege de geopolitieke context. Telkens kwamen er tekortkomingen aan het licht en werden er nieuwe verdragen geratificeerd of werden bestaande verdragen gewijzigd.

Ten eerste volgde het laatste verdrag, het Verdrag van Lissabon, een merkwaardig pad. Oorspronkelijk bedoeld als een nieuw verdrag, de Grondwet van de Europese Unie, werd het vervangen door een verdrag in de vorm van een uitgebreide lijst van amendementen op bestaande verdragen. Deze aanpak is zorgwekkend omdat het de democratische rechtsstaat ondermijnde, ook al kan men beargumenteren dat het een langverwachte noodzaak was. Het droeg niet bij aan de steun van de burgers, wat een risico op de lange termijn vormt dat zich momenteel aan het manifesteren is.

Ten tweede was het verdrag bedoeld om het democratische proces in Europa te versterken, maar in de praktijk is dit grotendeels mislukt. Zowel de nationale als de EU-parlementen, hoewel zij de officiële wetgevende machten zijn, bekrachtigen de voorstellen en richtlijnen van de Commissie grotendeels zonder meer. Zelden worden deze ter discussie gesteld. De reden hiervoor ligt niet zozeer in het verdrag zelf, maar in het feit dat de werkelijke macht in handen is van politieke partijen en de uitvoerende macht van de betreffende landen. Het is belangrijk op te merken dat dit vaak de situatie op nationaal niveau weerspiegelt, die vervolgens op EU-niveau wordt geprojecteerd. In beide gevallen handelen de parlementsleden, die geacht worden de burgers te vertegenwoordigen, niet in het belang van de burgers, maar in het belang van politieke partijen en de machtsstructuren die daarachter schuilgaan. Zoals reeds aangegeven, wordt deze ondermijning van democratische principes versterkt door een prominente meerderheid die de instellingen en de media heeft geïnfiltreerd. Daarnaast heeft het lobbyen van machtige groepen en organisaties een grote invloed op de besluitvormingsprocessen. Het Verdrag van Lissabon lijkt niet te hebben voorzien in de aanwezigheid van deze actoren die de democratie ondermijnen.

Ten derde droeg het Verdrag van Lissabon veel bevoegdheden over van nationaal naar Europees niveau. Het stelde de EU in staat om tijdens de Covid-pandemie strenge maatregelen op te leggen aan alle lidstaten, strenge CO2-emissieverplichtingen, een contraproductief energiebeleid en een lawine op vele gebieden aan regelgeving die niet alleen de industrie, maar ook het dagelijks leven van burgers beïnvloeden. Het is de vraag of deze ambitieuze plannen, zoals de “Green Deal”, ooit werkelijkheid zouden zijn geworden als er een echt democratisch besluitvormingsproces had plaatsgevonden. De praktijk heeft bovendien aangetoond dat het verdrag geen duidelijke grenzen trok tussen bevoegdheden op nationaal en supranationaal niveau. Deze zwakte werd uitgebuit om veel regelgeving van bovenaf op te leggen, waarbij vaak werd genegeerd dat de EU is samengesteld uit een heterogene groep natiestaten.

Ten vierde heeft het Verdrag van Lissabon geen structuur gecreëerd die de EU in staat zou stellen om op supranationaal niveau als een sterk, verenigd blok op te treden. Hoewel er enkele stappen zijn gezet, functioneert de EU in de praktijk nog steeds als een zwakke, opportunistische verzameling van nationale staten en staatshoofden, terwijl belangrijke beslissingen nog steeds door één enkele lidstaat kunnen worden geblokkeerd. Dit betreft domeinen als defensie, internationale politiek, economisch beleid en innovatiestrategie.

En tot slot, als we kijken naar wat de EU in Europa de afgelopen 20 jaar heeft bereikt, dan is het duidelijk dat het verdrag doordrongen was met wensdenken. De positie van de EU in de wereld is zowel economisch als politiek aan het krimpen en blijft dat doen. De EU staat bekend om haar hoge niveau van sociale zekerheidsprogramma’s, belastingen, regelgeving en de kwaliteit van het onderwijs. Deze worden steeds meer gefinancierd met schulden, terwijl de economie krimpt en de export dus niet de middelen genereert om dit te financieren. Andere machtscentra buiten deze zwakte uit, zowel economisch als geopolitiek. Zou er een handelsoorlog zijn geweest als de EU economisch sterk had gestaan? Zou er een enorme importafhankelijkheid met China zijn geweest als de Europese industrie concurentieel was gebleven? Zou er een oorlog met Rusland zijn geweest als de EU een sterke defensieve afschrikkingsorganisatie had gehad?

Al het bovenstaande wijst op de noodzaak om het Verdrag van Lissabon te herzien. Enerzijds moeten bevoegdheden worden teruggegeven aan de nationale staten en moeten burgers hun democratische controle terugkrijgen. Richtlijnen en normen kunnen supranationaal zijn, concrete regelgeving kan nationaal zijn. Anderzijds heeft de EU een veel sterkere structuur op supranationaal niveau nodig. In essentie zou de EU zich uitsluitend moeten richten op die domeinen die per definitie en in de praktijk supranationaal zijn.

Voorstellen tot wijziging van de huidige EU-verdragen, met name het Verdrag van Lissabon, zijn naar voren gekomen om diverse problemen aan te pakken die zijn vastgesteld met betrekking tot het functioneren en het bestuur van de EU. In het laatste deel belichten we enkele belangrijke voorstellen en discussies rondom deze wijzigingen. De meeste hiervan richten zich op de oprichting van een federale staat of op de verduidelijking van de huidige verdragen, terwijl wij van mening zijn dat, in lijn met de ideeën van Schuman, niets meer soevereiniteit op nationaal niveau uitsluit. Dit onderwerp van hervormingsinitiatieven wordt in een volgend werkdocument verder uitgewerkt.

Karamitsios, Yannis. Time for a European Federation:

How Europe could remain relevant in the century of globalization, climate change and the fourth industrial revolution. Peter Lang, 2022.

Book Details (https://www.peterlang.com/document/1159144)

https://www.time-for-a-european-federation.eu/

Yannis Karamitsios is a lawyer originally from Thessaloniki, Greece. Since 2006 he lives in Brussels and works as legal officer in the European Commission. He is a convinced federalist and he dedicates big part of his public action to the promotion of European and international federalism. He is an active member of the European federalist movement and has authored the book titled ‘Time for a European Federation’

The book offers a proposal for a next step in the EU integration, essentially proposing a federal Europe as a unified state, yet strengthening its known weakness in particularly in terms of its democratic deficit.

In attachment you find a critical review of the book, a short comprehense summary and a critical analysis based on academic sources. Finally, it is situated in the context of the range of federalist EU reform proposals was well as those based on the Swiss democracy model.

The book is highly recommended to understand what is a stake in Europe today, especially considering its current geopolitical challenges. It also highlights where the current Europe is lacking. As such, the proposal is well aligned with the goals of the Schuman2030 project. It is however a bit vague on how the shortcomings, that largely originated with the Lisbon Treaty have come about. The proposed power structure is a good start, open for debate.

Summary of the book Time for a European Federation by Yannis Karatmitsios 

While we continue to analyse the Lisbon Treaty in its current form, we have been digging in our archives.

At the we had WorkForAll.org as a think tank and while being supporters of a real Europe, the way things were going with the EU Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty were unacceptable. The EU was created notwithstanding the European citizens.  This was in the period 2007 – 2008. While our analysis today will be much wider (it will include the need for a federation with intra-national competences, while this weakness was also mentioned at the time), at the moment our major concern was the lack of democratic principles in its adoption and the impact the ensuing bureaucratic regulations would have on the EU’s prosperity and position in the world. Unfortunately, this has become true.

This gave rise to an opinion piece resulting in a hearing commission in then Flemish Parliament where our concerns were voiced. The text at the time was not a consolidated, very obfuscated and barely readable. It was mainly a collection of numerous changes to existing treaties;. Just one metric, in the Flemish version (the one discussed during the hearing) there ere about 1106 such text fragments spread over 283 pages.

The reader is free to browse through the various documents from the archive. We have included the original version in Flemish and translated some in English, adding some originals in English from the EU Eur-Lex portal.

Nederlandse tekst:

Terwijl we het Verdrag van Lissabon in zijn huidige vorm blijven analyseren, hebben we in onze archieven gegraven.

Toen het verdrag geratificeerd werd (2008) hadden we WorkForAll.org als denktank en hoewel we voorstanders waren en zijn  van een echt Europa, was de manier waarop men tewerk ging met de EU-grondwet en het Verdrag van Lissabon onaanvaardbaar. Het verdrag werd geratificeerd boven de hoofden van de Europese burgers.  Dit was in de periode 2007 – 2008. Hoewel onze analyse vandaag veel breder zal zijn (het zal de noodzaak van een federatie met intranationale bevoegdheden omvatten, terwijl deze zwakte destijds ook werd genoemd), was onze grootste zorg op dat moment het gebrek aan democratische principes bij de invoering ervan en de impact die de daaropvolgende bureaucratische regelgeving zou hebben op de welvaart en positie van de EU in de wereld. Helaas is dit inderdaad waar geworden.

Dit leidde tot een opiniestuk dat resulteerde in een hoorzittingscommissie in het toenmalige Vlaamse parlement waarin onze zorgen werden geuit. De tekst was destijds niet geconsolideerd, erg onduidelijk en nauwelijks leesbaar. Het was voornamelijk een verzameling van talrijke wijzigingen in bestaande verdragen. Slechts één metriek: in de Nederlandse versie (die tijdens de hoorzitting werd besproken) bevonden zich ongeveer 1106 van zulke tekstfragmenten verspreid over 283 pagina’s.

De lezer is vrij om door de verschillende documenten uit het archief te bladeren. We hebben de originele versie in het Nederlands opgenomen en sommige vertaald in het Engels, waarbij we enkele originelen in het Engels hebben toegevoegd van het EU Eur-Lex-portaal.

Attached documents – documenten in bijlage:

1.1 Verslag hoorzitting Vlaams Parlement Verdrag van Lissabon_2008_NL  (638 KB)

1.1. Report hearing Flemish Parliament Treaty of Lissabon_2008_EN (624 KB)

1.2 Hearing _Commission_on_Lisbon_Presentation_EN (620 KB)

1.2 Hoorcommissie Over Lissabon_Presentatie_NL (161 KB)

1.3 Het neen van de Ieren_NL (123 KB) (123 KB) 

1.3 The NO of the Irish_EN (123 KB)

1.4 CELEX_11992M_TXT_EN_Treaty on the European Union (11,1 MB)

1.5 LexUriServ_hoofdtekst (313 KB)

1.6 Treaty_of_Lisbon_DOC_19 (EN) (52,9 MB)

1.6 Verdrag_van_Lissabon_DOC_19 (NL) (54 MB)

1.7 Ontwerp decreet g1653-1 (12,9 MB)

1.8 WEF_Lisbon_Review_2004 (159 KB)

Hereby the first release (V.1.5) of the Working Paper 3 on the Power structure in the European Union. 

English version:

WP3_EU_PowerStructure_v.1-5_EN

In Dutch:

WP3_EU_PowerStructure_v.1-5_NL

Hereby the second release (V.1.6) of the Working Paper 2 on the Foundation of the European Union. 

Changes: v.1.6 – added section on current treaties

English version:

WP2_EU Foundation_v.1-6_EN

In Dutch:

WP2_EU Foundation_v.1-6_NL

A key question is, what makes a socio-political system more efficient than others? As one can read in WP1, the difference between two similar countries (Switzerland and Belgium) can be significant. The comparison can be made using several metrics but in the end it’s always the output level that counts, for example the GDP per capita. In this case Switzerland performs 20 to 30% better than Belgium (section 5.6 in WP1) Hence, the country produces more wealth. More wealth that can be used to improve the life and environment for all. Think about better roads, public transport, culture, innovation, etc. A lesser performance also translates in lesser performance in other metrics like unemployment rate, public debt and inflation. Hence, the wealth is also less well spend, not on innovation and quality of life but on non-productive expenditures. The latter starts a vicious cycle as the growing budget deficits shows in Belgium.

To illustrate and analyse this further, we look at the performance in education. While not listed in WP1, Belgium spends 6,6% of its GDP on education while Switzerland 5,6% but in nominal terms the figures per capita are €3386 and €5280 respectively which means 56% more for Switzerland. Swiss students consistently outperform their Belgian counterparts in mathematics. While Belgium’s science scores have declined by 11 points since 2015, Swiss performance in science has remained remarkably stable.

This situation is well known in Belgium and its not only related to the expenditures. For example, from 2014 to 2024, the total education workforce in Flanders (teachers and administrators) grew by nearly 13% to 14% over a single decade while the number of pupils only rose by 7%. Despite having more staff per student than 50 years ago, educational outcomes (PISA scores) in both Flanders and Wallonia have reached historical lows in 2025. 

A deeper analysis points to a structural cause. In 1975 (Flanders) and 1978 (French Community) a “Reformed Secondary Education” (RSE) was introduced to replace traditional rigid tracks with a more flexible, comprehensive system aimed at increasing “social equality”. This had multiple effects that reduced the efficiency. Both regions centralised education away from the schools and teachers and imposed rather inflexible teaching programs while burdering them with many more administrative tasks. In the Flemish Community (2024–2025 school year), the workforce has grown to approximately 179,205 full-time equivalents (FTE) with 13,243 FTE or 7,4% strictly dedicated to non-teaching positions such as principals, inspectors, student counselors, and Centre for Educational Guidance (CLB) staff. Worse is that teaching staff is burdened with what teachers call “excessive administrative work”.  One result is that many leave the profession and there is a shortage of staff. If only a quarter of the administrative staff would return to teaching, the gaps would be filled.

This highlights the structural differences between the bottom-up and decentralised subsidiarity in Switzerland and the top-down centralised subsidiarity in Belgium. In a decentralised system the responsibility is mostly with the citizens away from central planners dictating every detail. It is motivating to be responsible and being able to apply one’s education and skills for the best as one sees fit. While not everyone is perfect and makes mistakes, the correction loop is short. A teacher knows his class and a school knows his teachers. The central ministry has to rely on reports. By imposing how and what teachers should do, a mistake was made that only becomes visible years later in e.g. international scores. The cost of excessive administration has wide-spreading effects not only by taking away resources from teaching, but also by demotivating teachers and producing less educated students. The goal of achieving of “social equality”  by imposing equal teaching was a failure that affected everyone. And while some reforms are now underway to correct this view, it took 50 years and affected a whole generation. This also contributed to the lower economical performance we mentioned at the beginning of this post. A well performing country is the work of qualified people, whether they work in the public or private sector.

Jack Birner, professor emeritus at University of Trento, Department of Sociology and Social Research, gave a talk for the Workshop “Democracy in the real world, Epistemic challenges and behavioural insights, Pisa, 20 November 2025. The discussion of Popper’s four paradoxes related to democracy leads to a distinction between two models or types of democracy, i.e.  Deliberative Democracy and Critical Democracy. These correspond more or less with what we call  Representative or Conflict Democracy and Consensus Democracy.

Hereby a list of the paradoxes: 

P1: The paradox of democracy (this is the risk of the dictatorship of the majority discussed in WP1).
P2: The paradox of freedom
P3: The paradox of sovereignty
P4: The paradox of tolerance
P5: The paradox of representation
P6: The paradox of the popularity of DD (Deliberative Democracy, aka participatory democracy)
P7: The paradox of information
P8: The paradox of truthfulness
P9: The paradox of time, or of the time horizon
P10: The paradox of the success of democracy
P11: The paradox of the attractiveness of democracy
P12: The paradox of populism.

In his talk he starts from Plato, Popper and Hayek. A few extracts to think about

“Popper proposes to replace Plato’s question of who should rule by the question: “How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?”

“Prepare for the worst, aim for the best. We may call this Popper’s maximin rule. And in fact, a guiding principle of his social and political philosophy is the idea that instead of the state having the task of maximizing the happiness of its citizens, it should limit itself to reducing their suffering. John Watkins has coined the label of negative utilitarianism for this.”

It seems to us that the Swiss democratic system has foud a way to implement this in reality by having a system that must provide for all citizens and obtain their approval. This avoid the conflicts whereby the winner takes all and mainly looks for the special interest of who has elected them.

Source: https://www.academia.edu/145145144/Some_paradoxes_of_democracy

Also have a look at the other work of Jack Birner.

Some_paradoxes_of_democracy