Schuman2030

Hereby the first release (V.1.5) of the Working Paper 3 on the Power structure in the European Union. 

English version:

WP3_EU_PowerStructure_v.1-5_EN

In Dutch:

WP3_EU_PowerStructure_v.1-5_NL

Hereby the second release (V.1.6) of the Working Paper 2 on the Foundation of the European Union. 

Changes: v.1.6 – added section on current treaties

English version:

WP2_EU Foundation_v.1-6_EN

In Dutch:

WP2_EU Foundation_v.1-6_NL

A key question is, what makes a socio-political system more efficient than others? As one can read in WP1, the difference between two similar countries (Switzerland and Belgium) can be significant. The comparison can be made using several metrics but in the end it’s always the output level that counts, for example the GDP per capita. In this case Switzerland performs 20 to 30% better than Belgium (section 5.6 in WP1) Hence, the country produces more wealth. More wealth that can be used to improve the life and environment for all. Think about better roads, public transport, culture, innovation, etc. A lesser performance also translates in lesser performance in other metrics like unemployment rate, public debt and inflation. Hence, the wealth is also less well spend, not on innovation and quality of life but on non-productive expenditures. The latter starts a vicious cycle as the growing budget deficits shows in Belgium.

To illustrate and analyse this further, we look at the performance in education. While not listed in WP1, Belgium spends 6,6% of its GDP on education while Switzerland 5,6% but in nominal terms the figures per capita are €3386 and €5280 respectively which means 56% more for Switzerland. Swiss students consistently outperform their Belgian counterparts in mathematics. While Belgium’s science scores have declined by 11 points since 2015, Swiss performance in science has remained remarkably stable.

This situation is well known in Belgium and its not only related to the expenditures. For example, from 2014 to 2024, the total education workforce in Flanders (teachers and administrators) grew by nearly 13% to 14% over a single decade while the number of pupils only rose by 7%. Despite having more staff per student than 50 years ago, educational outcomes (PISA scores) in both Flanders and Wallonia have reached historical lows in 2025. 

A deeper analysis points to a structural cause. In 1975 (Flanders) and 1978 (French Community) a “Reformed Secondary Education” (RSE) was introduced to replace traditional rigid tracks with a more flexible, comprehensive system aimed at increasing “social equality”. This had multiple effects that reduced the efficiency. Both regions centralised education away from the schools and teachers and imposed rather inflexible teaching programs while burdering them with many more administrative tasks. In the Flemish Community (2024–2025 school year), the workforce has grown to approximately 179,205 full-time equivalents (FTE) with 13,243 FTE or 7,4% strictly dedicated to non-teaching positions such as principals, inspectors, student counselors, and Centre for Educational Guidance (CLB) staff. Worse is that teaching staff is burdened with what teachers call “excessive administrative work”.  One result is that many leave the profession and there is a shortage of staff. If only a quarter of the administrative staff would return to teaching, the gaps would be filled.

This highlights the structural differences between the bottom-up and decentralised subsidiarity in Switzerland and the top-down centralised subsidiarity in Belgium. In a decentralised system the responsibility is mostly with the citizens away from central planners dictating every detail. It is motivating to be responsible and being able to apply one’s education and skills for the best as one sees fit. While not everyone is perfect and makes mistakes, the correction loop is short. A teacher knows his class and a school knows his teachers. The central ministry has to rely on reports. By imposing how and what teachers should do, a mistake was made that only becomes visible years later in e.g. international scores. The cost of excessive administration has wide-spreading effects not only by taking away resources from teaching, but also by demotivating teachers and producing less educated students. The goal of achieving of “social equality”  by imposing equal teaching was a failure that affected everyone. And while some reforms are now underway to correct this view, it took 50 years and affected a whole generation. This also contributed to the lower economical performance we mentioned at the beginning of this post. A well performing country is the work of qualified people, whether they work in the public or private sector.

Jack Birner, professor emeritus at University of Trento, Department of Sociology and Social Research, gave a talk for the Workshop “Democracy in the real world, Epistemic challenges and behavioural insights, Pisa, 20 November 2025. The discussion of Popper’s four paradoxes related to democracy leads to a distinction between two models or types of democracy, i.e.  Deliberative Democracy and Critical Democracy. These correspond more or less with what we call  Representative or Conflict Democracy and Consensus Democracy.

Hereby a list of the paradoxes: 

P1: The paradox of democracy (this is the risk of the dictatorship of the majority discussed in WP1).
P2: The paradox of freedom
P3: The paradox of sovereignty
P4: The paradox of tolerance
P5: The paradox of representation
P6: The paradox of the popularity of DD (Deliberative Democracy, aka participatory democracy)
P7: The paradox of information
P8: The paradox of truthfulness
P9: The paradox of time, or of the time horizon
P10: The paradox of the success of democracy
P11: The paradox of the attractiveness of democracy
P12: The paradox of populism.

In his talk he starts from Plato, Popper and Hayek. A few extracts to think about

“Popper proposes to replace Plato’s question of who should rule by the question: “How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?”

“Prepare for the worst, aim for the best. We may call this Popper’s maximin rule. And in fact, a guiding principle of his social and political philosophy is the idea that instead of the state having the task of maximizing the happiness of its citizens, it should limit itself to reducing their suffering. John Watkins has coined the label of negative utilitarianism for this.”

It seems to us that the Swiss democratic system has foud a way to implement this in reality by having a system that must provide for all citizens and obtain their approval. This avoid the conflicts whereby the winner takes all and mainly looks for the special interest of who has elected them.

Source: https://www.academia.edu/145145144/Some_paradoxes_of_democracy

Also have a look at the other work of Jack Birner.

Some_paradoxes_of_democracy

Hereby the first release (V.1.5) of the Working Paper 1 on direct democracy in Switzerland, including a comparison with Belgium, which is a country of similar size but with a representative democracy system.

0. Democracy and political parties in SwitzerlandV_1-5_EN

Hierbij de eerste versie (V.1.5) van het werkdocument 1 over de directe democratie in Zwitserland, inclusief een vergelijking met België, een land van vergelijkbare omvang maar met een representatieve democratie.

De oorspronkelijke tekst is in het Engels geschreven; de lezer kan ook een Nederlandse versie downloaden.

0. Democracy and political parties in SwitzerlandV_1-5_NL

Voici la première version (V.1.5) du Document de travail n° 1 sur la démocratie directe en Suisse, incluant une comparaison avec la Belgique, pays de taille similaire doté d’un système de démocratie représentative.

Le texte original est en anglais ; une version en français est également disponible en téléchargement. Cette version n’est pas encore corrigée (grammaire).

0. Democracy and political parties in SwitzerlandV_1-5_FR

Hiermit erscheint die erste Version (V.1.5) des Arbeitspapiers 1 zur direkten Demokratie in der Schweiz, inklusive eines Vergleichs mit Belgien, einem Land ähnlicher Größe mit einem repräsentativen Demokratiemodell.

Der Originaltext ist auf Englisch verfasst; eine deutsche Version steht ebenfalls zum Download bereit. Diese Version wurde noch nicht auf Grammatikfehler geprüft.

0. Democracy and political parties in SwitzerlandV_1-5_DE

This document is a short Policy Brief on the Schuman2030 project’s goals and vision. Following Working Papers will consist of specfic topics and analyse them in more depth.

The policy covers following topics:

1. A short introduction on “The EU’s Democratic Evolution”
2. Summary for Policymakers: “Subsidiarity & Direct Democracy Protocol”
3. Subsidiarity: a bottom-up competence model.
4. Strengthening Subsidiarity — A Tiered Competence Model for Bottom-Up Democracy
5. Competence Allocation. A Bottom-Up Subsidiarity-Based EU
6. EU Long-Term Strategic Framework

PolicyBrief_Schuman2030_V-1-0

The Schuman Project (found at schuman.info) is an independent research initiative directed by historian David Heilbron Price. It is arguably the most detailed resource available for anyone looking to understand the “Institutional Gap” we are exploring.

The project acts as a “intellectual watchdog,” arguing that the modern European Union has effectively “hijacked” or “counterfeited” Robert Schuman’s original democratic design.

Beow a synopsis of the analysis on Schuman.info:

1. The “Supranational” vs. “Federal” Distinction

The project emphasizes a distinction that is often lost in modern politics: Schuman did not want a Federal Europe (a United States of Europe) or an Intergovernmental Europe (a club of governments).

• Schuman’s Vision: A “Supranational Community” where power is delegated by the people to independent bodies that are strictly held accountable by a House of the People.
• The Project’s Critique: It argues the current EU is a “technocratic cartel” where unelected officials and heads of state make deals behind closed doors, which is the exact opposite of what Schuman proposed in 1950.

2. The “Great Charter” and Hidden History

One of the most unique aspects of the Schuman Project is its focus on the 1951 Charter of the Community. Price argues that the EU has “forgotten” or “hidden” its own founding democratic principles.

• The project highlights that Schuman’s original plan required direct elections and public transparency as a prerequisite for any power transfer.
• It accuses modern EU leaders of “legal forgery”—passing treaties like the Lisbon Treaty which, according to the project, are “undemocratic, even anti-democratic” because they bypass the direct consent of the people (referendums).

3. The “Democratic Deficit” as a “Democratic Deceit”

While mainstream media calls it a “deficit,” the Schuman Project labels it a “Deceit.” * It provides evidence that the European Commission has moved away from being a “technical servant” of the nations (as Schuman intended) to becoming a political body that lacks the moral authority Schuman believed was necessary.

• It specifically critiques the Council of Ministers for acting as a “secretive legislature,” which Schuman warned would lead to the very nationalism and distrust we see today.

4. Key “Schuman Project” Resources for Research:

These are the strongest sections:

• “The Warning of Political Counterfeiters”: Based on Schuman’s 1963 warnings that politicians would try to strip the “soul” out of the community and replace it with a cold bureaucracy.
• “Schuman vs. Monnet”: The project argues that Jean Monnet (the technocrat) has been unfairly credited at the expense of Schuman (the democrat), leading to an EU that prioritizes efficiency over human rights and democracy.
• “The Five Key Institutions”: A breakdown of how Schuman’s original 5-pillar system was designed to prevent the centralisation of power we see today. See https://www.schuman.info/supra5.htm

I. Primary Sources: Schuman’s Writings & Speeches

• Schuman, Robert. Pour l’Europe (For Europe).
• First published in 1963. This is Schuman’s “political testament.” It details his belief that democracy is a Christian development and argues for a supranationalism that preserves national identity rather than erasing it.
• The Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950).
• French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d’Orsay). The foundational document of the European project. It contains the famous “de facto solidarity” and “Europe will not be made all at once” quotes.
• Schuman, Robert. Speech to the European Parliamentary Assembly (19 March 1958).
• In his inaugural speech as the first President of the Assembly, Schuman outlines the role of the parliament as the moral and democratic supervisor of the European executive.
• Speech by Robert Schuman at the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 10 December 1951).
• A critical primary source where Schuman explains that European integration is not about power, but about “peace through the equality of nations.”

II. Institutional & Legal Documents

• The Treaty of Lisbon (2007/2009).
• Official Journal of the European Union. This treaty introduced the “Yellow Card” mechanism (Protocol No. 2) meant to allow national parliaments to check EU overreach—a key point in your “Democratic Deficit” argument.
• The Treaty of Paris (1951).
• The founding document of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It outlines the powers of the original “High Authority,” which was significantly more independent and sector-specific than the modern Commission.
• European Commission Annual Reports on Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
• Specifically, see reports from 2013 (EPPO case) and 2016 (Posted Workers case) to verify the rejection of national parliamentary objections.

III. Academic & Scholarly Analysis

• Majone, Giandomenico. Europe as the Regulatory State.
• A seminal work on how the EU evolved into a “technocracy.” Majone argues that the EU’s legitimacy comes from its efficiency and expertise rather than direct democratic participation—a contrast to Schuman’s “people-first” model.
• Moravcsik, Andrew. “In Defense of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union.”
• A famous academic paper that argues the “deficit” is intentional and beneficial, providing a strong counter-point to Schuman’s vision of a more transparent, public-led union.
• Fountain, Jeff. The Forgotten Vision of Robert Schuman.
• Schuman Centre for European Studies (2010). This analysis focuses specifically on the Christian Humanist roots of Schuman’s vision and how they have been replaced by secular technocracy.

IV. Digital Archives & Research Tools

• CVCE (Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe):
  • An excellent digital library hosted by the University of Luxembourg. Search for “Robert Schuman” to find original letters, draft declarations, and audio-visual recordings of his speeches.
• The Robert Schuman Foundation (Fondation Robert Schuman):
  • A research center that publishes regular “Schuman Papers” analyzing modern EU policy through the lens of Schuman’s original principles.

• The Schuman Project (schuman.info)

  • The Schuman Project is an independent research initiative directed by historian David Heilbron Price. It is arguably the most detailed resource available for anyone looking to understand the “Institutional Gap” we have been exploring. The project acts as a “intellectual watchdog,” arguing that the modern European Union has effectively “hijacked” or “counterfeited” Robert Schuman’s original democratic design.